Faculty

Institution

Unit

Venue

Samuel Lee

Associate Professor Finance

Santa Clara University

Affiliations

Leavey School of Business

Samuel Lee is currently serving as a Leavey School Of Business Associate Professor Finance at Santa Clara University.

Honors

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Experiences

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Education

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Samuel Lee

Santa Clara University

Associate Professor Finance

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finance economics corporate finance corporate control political science business finance research game theory corporate governance financial studies economic analysis household finance voting rule entrepreneurial finance decision theory economic theory democratic theory theories of political behavior competition (economics) group decision european public policy theoretical economics social choice political analysis financial stability global finance social science research interpersonal violence violence against women feminist criminology violent behavior entrepreneurship political theory non-cooperative game theory theory building cooperative game theory negotiation theory corporate strategy activism financial risk management public governance sustainable finance financial structure credit markets innovative financing market behavior circle method sociological research inter-firm coordination dynamic competition corporate compliance market power market manipulation sexual violence dynamic economics market microstructure social theory vote debate theoretical perspective bidder screening security-voting structure regulating prostitution human trafficking risk management failures social incentives authority versus loyalty smart buyers tender offer games activist investors rival information informal finance limited liability financial perspective financialization hedge fund activism financial law

Notable Scholarly Works

Notable Federal Grants

Collaborators

The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Control. SSRN Electronic Journal (2024)

Mike BurkartSamuel LeePaul Voss

dynamic competitioneconomicscorporate compliancemarket (economics)market manipulationmarket powercorporate controlbusiness

Human Trafficking and Regulating Prostitution. American Economic Journal Economic Policy (2022)

Samuel LeePetra Persson

economic policyhuman traffickinglaw and economicsapplied economicspublic policyeconomicslawpublic economicsregulating prostitutioncommercial law

Activism and Takeovers. Review of Financial Studies (2021)

Mike BurkartSamuel Lee

financecorporate financefinancial studiesactivism

Circles of Trust: Rival Information in Social Networks. National Bureau of Economic Research (2021)

Petra PerssonNikita RoketskiySamuel Lee

trustsocial network analysisrival informationpolitical science

The Social Value of Debt in the Market for Corporate Control. SSRN Electronic Journal (2020)

Mike BurkartSamuel LeeHenrik Petri

economicsfinancecorporate financesocial valuecorporate control

Risk Management Failures. Review of Financial Studies (2019)

Matthieu BouvardSamuel Lee

risk management failuresfinancefinancial risk managementfinancial studiesrisk management

Financing From Family and Friends. Review of Financial Studies (2016)

Samuel LeePetra Persson

financehousehold finance

Smart Buyers. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies (2016)

Mike BurkartSamuel Lee

smart buyersfinance researchfinancecorporate financebusinesssustainable financeconsumer behaviour

Violence and Entry in Prostitution Markets. Oxford University Press eBooks (2016)

Samuel LeePetra Persson

criminologyfeminist criminologyviolence against womeninterpersonal violencehumanitiesviolent behaviorsexual violence

Activist Investors as Brokers of Corporate Control. SSRN Electronic Journal (2015)

Mike BurkartSamuel Lee

financecorporate financecorporate controlactivist investorscorporate governance

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Samuel Lee

Associate Professor Finance

Santa Clara University

Affiliations

Leavey School of Business

Samuel Lee is currently serving as a Leavey School Of Business Associate Professor Finance at Santa Clara University.

Honors

Create free account to unlock more features

Experiences

Create free account to unlock more features

Education

Create free account to unlock more features

Samuel Lee

Santa Clara University

Associate Professor Finance

You can click a keyword to filter the displayed items

Notable Scholarly Works

Notable Federal Grants

Collaborators

The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Control. SSRN Electronic Journal (2024)

Mike BurkartSamuel LeePaul Voss

dynamic competitioneconomicscorporate compliancemarket (economics)market manipulationmarket powercorporate controlbusiness

Human Trafficking and Regulating Prostitution. American Economic Journal Economic Policy (2022)

Samuel LeePetra Persson

economic policyhuman traffickinglaw and economicsapplied economicspublic policyeconomicslawpublic economicsregulating prostitutioncommercial law

Activism and Takeovers. Review of Financial Studies (2021)

Mike BurkartSamuel Lee

financecorporate financefinancial studiesactivism

Circles of Trust: Rival Information in Social Networks. National Bureau of Economic Research (2021)

Petra PerssonNikita RoketskiySamuel Lee

trustsocial network analysisrival informationpolitical science

The Social Value of Debt in the Market for Corporate Control. SSRN Electronic Journal (2020)

Mike BurkartSamuel LeeHenrik Petri

economicsfinancecorporate financesocial valuecorporate control

Risk Management Failures. Review of Financial Studies (2019)

Matthieu BouvardSamuel Lee

risk management failuresfinancefinancial risk managementfinancial studiesrisk management

Financing From Family and Friends. Review of Financial Studies (2016)

Samuel LeePetra Persson

financehousehold finance

Smart Buyers. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies (2016)

Mike BurkartSamuel Lee

smart buyersfinance researchfinancecorporate financebusinesssustainable financeconsumer behaviour

Violence and Entry in Prostitution Markets. Oxford University Press eBooks (2016)

Samuel LeePetra Persson

criminologyfeminist criminologyviolence against womeninterpersonal violencehumanitiesviolent behaviorsexual violence

Activist Investors as Brokers of Corporate Control. SSRN Electronic Journal (2015)

Mike BurkartSamuel Lee

financecorporate financecorporate controlactivist investorscorporate governance

1
2
3
10 / page

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